Verity v. USA Today Amicus Brief Dckt. 45530 by unknown
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
4-25-2018 
Verity v. USA Today Amicus Brief Dckt. 45530 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs 
Recommended Citation 
"Verity v. USA Today Amicus Brief Dckt. 45530" (2018). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 7256. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7256 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by 
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact 
annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO 
JAMES VERITY and SARAHNA VERITY, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
USA TODAY, a division of Gannett Satellite 
Information Network, LLC, a Delaware limited 
liability company; KTVB, a division of King 
Broadcasting Company a Washington 
corporation; KGW, a division of Sander 
Operating Co. III, LLC, a Delaware limited 
liability company; TAMI TREMBLAY, an 
individual; STEPHEN REILLY, an individual; 
and JOHN / JANE DOES, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Supreme Court Docket No. 45530-2017 
Ada County No. CVOC-2016-6185 
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 
The Associnted Press, The Hearst Corporation, And The Idaho Press Club 
Proposed additional Amici: Adams Publishing Group, Advance Publications, The AmeriCAn Society of News Editors, BuzzFced, 
The Center for Investigative Reporting, CNN, Dow Jones & Company, The E.W. Scripps Company, First Look Medin, Forbes, Gray 
Television, The Idaho Statesman, Landmark Media Enterprises, The Media Institute, Meredith Corporation, The NationRI Association 
of Broadcasters, The News Media Alliance, The New York Times Company, POLITICO, The Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the 
Press, The Radio nnd Television Dillital News Associntion, The Society for Professional Journalists, tronc, 1rnd The W11shin2ton Post 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, 
Honorable Melissa Moody, District Judge, Presiding 
Debora K. Kristensen 
Kersti H. Kennedy 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Counsel for Appellants USA Today, KTVB, 
KGW, Tami Tremblay and Stephen Reilly 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Counsel for Amici Curiae 
Ronald R. Shepherd 
SHEP LAW GROUP 
I 990 North Meridian Road 
Meridian, ID 83642 




BALLARD SPAHR LLP 
1909 K Street Northwest, 121" Floor 
Washington, DC 20006 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 1 
THE LOWER COURT’S DECISION ............................................................................................ 4 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 6 
I. Because Defamation-By-Implication Claims Based on the Reporting of Accurate Facts 
About Matters of Public Concern Necessarily Implicate First Amendment Freedoms, 
Several States Have Declined to Recognize Such a Cause of Action ................................ 7 
II. If this Court Does Decide to Recognize a Cause of Action for Defamation-by-
Implication, the Scope of the Tort Should be Narrowly and Precisely Defined to 
Safeguard Truthful Speech About Public Matters ............................................................ 12 
A. The Threshold Determination ........................................................................................ 12 
B. The Fact-Based Determination ....................................................................................... 19 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 24 







TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 Page(s) 
CASES 
Abadian v. Lee, 
117 F. Supp. 2d 481 (D. Md. 2000) ...................................................................................13, 14 
Biro v. Conde Nast, 
883 F. Supp. 2d 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ..........................................................................10, 14, 18 
Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 
993 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993) .....................................................................................12, 14, 22 
Collins v. WAFB, LLC, 
2017 WL 1383948 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2017) .............................................................................9 
Denver Publishing Co. v. Bueno, 
54 P.3d 893 (Colo. 2002) .........................................................................................................11 
Deripaska v. Associated Press, 
282 F. Supp. 3d 133 (D.D.C. 2017) .........................................................................................14 
Diesen v. Hessburg, 
455 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. 1990)...................................................................................................9 
Dobkin v. Johns Hopkins University, 
172 F.3d 43 (4th Cir. 1999) .....................................................................................................11 
Dodds v. American Broadcasting Co., 
145 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................20 
Duncan v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., 
2011 WL 1807017 (S.D.W. Va. May 9, 2011) ........................................................................14 
Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 
737 So. 2d 706 (La. 1999) .........................................................................................................9 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 64 (1964) ...................................................................................................................19 
Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 




Heyward v. Credit Union Times, 
913 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D.N.M. 2012) ......................................................................................14 
Hoskins v. Howard, 
971 P.2d 1135 (1998) ...............................................................................................................11 
Jacobson v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 
19 N.E.3d 1165, 1178 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) ........................................................................20, 22 
Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 
788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1986) .................................................................................................23 
Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 
997 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2008).....................................................................................................11 
Kavanagh v. Zwilling, 
578 F. App’x 24 (2d Cir. 2014) ...............................................................................................14 
Kendall v. Daily News Publishing Co., 
716 F.3d 82 (3d Cir. 2013)...........................................................................................19, 20, 23 
Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998).................................................................................................11 
Leddy v. Narragansett Television, L.P., 
843 A.2d 481 (R.I. 2004) .........................................................................................................14 
Mihalik v. Duprey, 
417 N.E.2d 1238 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981) ...................................................................................9 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964) .............................................................................................................1, 19 
Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., 
930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990) .............................................................................................19, 22 
Nichols v. Moore, 
477 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2007) .............................................................................................19, 21 
Partington v. Bugliosi, 




Puckett v. American Broadcasting Cos., 
917 F.2d 1305 (6th Cir. 1990) .................................................................................................11 
Revil v. Coleman, 
54 N.E.3d 608 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016) .....................................................................................18 
Rinsley v. Brandt, 
700 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1983) ...............................................................................................10 
Royal Palace Homes, Inc. v. Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc., 
495 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) ..................................................................................14 
Rubin v. U.S. News & World Report, 
271 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) ...............................................................................................13 
Saenz v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 
841 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988) .................................................................................................19 
Schaefer v. Lynch, 
406 So. 2d 185 (La. 1981) .........................................................................................................9 
Schifano v. Greene County Greyhound Park, Inc., 
624 So. 2d 178 (Ala. 1993) ......................................................................................................11 
Stepanov v. Dow Jones & Co., 
120 A.D.3d 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) ..............................................................................13, 14 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 
385 U.S. 374 (1967) .................................................................................................................11 
Veilleux v. National Broadcasting Co., 
206 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2000) ......................................................................................................11 
Webb v. Virginian-Pilot Media Cos., 
752 S.E.2d 808 (Va. 2014).................................................................................................14, 17 
White v Fraternal Order of Police, 
707 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1989) ....................................................................................8, 13, 17 
White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 




Wiemer v. Rankin, 
790 P.2d 347 (Idaho 1990).................................................................................................10, 23 
Woods v. Evansville Press Co., 
791 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1986) ...............................................................................................8, 20 
Worrell-Payne v. Gannett Co., 
134 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Idaho 2000) ....................................................................................19 
Wyoming Corporate Services v. CNBC, LLC, 
32 F. Supp. 3d 1177 (D. Wyo. 2014) .......................................................................................14 
Zeran v. Diamond Broadcasting, Inc., 
203 F.3d 714 (10th Cir. 2000) .................................................................................................11 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
3 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 566  
(2d ed. 2011) ............................................................................................................................10 
D. L. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed,  
64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 364 (1989) .................................................................................................11 
Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussel, The Plaintiff’s Burden in Defamation: Awareness 
and Falsity, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 825 (1984) ...................................................................10 
Peter B Kutner, What Is Truth? True Suspects and False Defamation, 19 Fordham Intell. 
Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1 (2008) ............................................................................................10 




Amici Curiae are a coalition of media organizations – as well as non-profit and trade 
groups supporting journalists – in Idaho and throughout the country that are deeply concerned by 
the lower court’s decision in this case.  The lower court created an unprecedented cause of action 
in this state for “defamation-by-implication,” one which subjects journalists and media 
organizations to liability even when everything they report is concededly true and addresses a 
subject of legitimate public concern.  The decision is contrary to a long line of precedent in other 
states and in the federal courts, which has either declined to recognize such a cause of action at 
all or, at the very least, has severely limited its scope.  If the decision below is permitted to stand, 
journalists and media organizations reporting in Idaho will be severely hampered in their efforts 
to serve our nation’s “profound national commitment” to a fully informed debate about public 
issues.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
BACKGROUND 
In 2016, USA TODAY, along with two television stations serving viewers in Oregon and 
Idaho respectively, reported on the results of a collaborative national investigation into statewide 
school systems that granted licenses to teachers whose credentials had been revoked in another 
state.  R. 1526-28.  The plaintiff, James Verity, is one such teacher.  Specifically, the USA 
TODAY article at issue – which was posted on the website of television station KGW in 
Portland – reported that, in 2005, Verity taught middle school and coached high school girls’ 
softball and basketball in Oregon.  The article then explained that: 
That year school administrators learned that Verity had been exchanging text 




state revoked Verity’s license after officials found he engaged in physical contact 
with the student, including “kissing on the lips, neck and earlobe, grinding his 
pelvis in her pelvic area and touching her breasts and groin area.” 
 
When he tried to re-apply for a teaching license in 2009, a psychiatrist evaluating 
Verity recommended that he “not be left alone with any female student over the 
age of 12 in order to protect Mr. Verity and the student,” according to discipline 
records [ ]. 
 
The Oregon Teacher Standards and Practices Commission denied Verity’s 
application to reinstate his teaching license. 
 
After the denial, records show Verity moved to Idaho where he was granted a 
teaching license.  He worked in the Caldwell School District from 2010 to 2014.  
Superintendent Jodie Mills told USA Today the district was never made aware his 
license was revoked in Oregon.  She said the revocation would “absolutely” have 
been a concern had it come to the district’s attention. 
 
Since 2014, Verity has taught sixth grade science at Sage Valley Middle School in 
the Valivue School District, which is outside Boise.  Valivue superintendent Pat 
Charlton said Verity “disclosed to his building principal that there had been an 
incident involving an 18-year-old female, eight years earlier, but no charges had 
been filed.” 
 
R. 525-33.  The portion of the article concerning Verity closed by noting that he had declined to 
comment for the story, except to say that “the incident with the student happened in 2005 and 
that his ‘life has changed significantly since then.’”  It is undisputed that every fact set out in the 
USA TODAY article about Verity is entirely accurate.  
On same day that KGW posted the USA TODAY story on its website, it also broadcast a 
shortened version of the story.   It included only a brief reference to Verity: 
[I]n 2005, school administrators learned Verity had exchanged thousands of text 
messages, many of them late at night, with a female student.  State teacher 





Oregon revoked Verity’s teaching license.  When he tried to re-apply several 
years later, a psychiatrist recommended he “not be left alone with any female 
student over the age of 12 in order to protect Mr. Verity and the student.” 
 
But the very next year, Verity was back in the classroom – this time 300 miles 
away across state lines near Boise, Idaho.  And today, he’s still teaching.  Our 
investigation found Verity’s case is not an isolated example. 
 
Supp. R. at Kristensen Decl., Ex. 68.  In addition, KGW advised its viewers that Verity had 
declined an on-camera interview, saying only that his “life has changed” in the years since.  At 
the end of the broadcast, the reporter noted, “[w]e also have much more on this story on 
KGW.com.”  Id.  Again, it is undisputed that every reference to Verity in the KGW broadcast is 
entirely accurate. 
 The following week, KTVB, a television station based in Boise, broadcast the following: 
In 2005, school administrators learned Verity had exchanged thousands of text 
messages, many of them late at night, with an 18-year-old female student.  
Discipline records for Oregon teachers show they developed a sexual relationship. 
 
Oregon revoked Verity’s teaching license.  When he tried to reapply several years 
later, a psychiatrist recommended he “not be left alone with any female student 
over the age of 12 in order to protect Mr. Verity and the student.”  He was denied 
a new teaching license.  But the very next year, Verity was back in the classroom.  




Mr. Verity . . . worked for the Caldwell School District from 2010 to 2011 and 
from 2013 to 2014.  The Superintendent there, Jodie Mills, tells us they had no 
idea about his past record.  Verity started working in the Vallivue School District 









Now his superintendent, Pat Charlton of Vallivue School District told us Verity’s 
background checks came back clean, and he had positive recommendations.  
Charlton also says Verity told his principal at Sage Valley about his disciplinary 
action in Oregon.  He says because criminal charges were never filed, since the 
student was 18, they chose to keep him in the classroom.  . . . Verity did tell us his 
life had changed significantly since having a relationship with that student 11 
years ago. 
 
Supp. R. at Kristensen Decl., Ex. 69.  Like the USA TODAY article and the KGW broadcast, it 
is undisputed that every one of these facts reported about Verity in the KTVB broadcast is 
entirely accurate.  
In this civil action, Verity asserts causes of action for defamation, false light invasion of 
privacy, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the USA TODAY 
article and the two broadcasts.  Because he cannot – and does not – contest the accuracy of the 
facts actually contained in these stories, he bases his claims instead on the contention that they 
nevertheless give rise to false implications about him, specifically:  
(1)  That he “was a danger to female students,” R. 1533; 
(2)  That he “deceived Idaho officials by hiding his past conduct,” id.; and 
(3)  That he “committed a crime by having sex with a student,” R. 1534.1   
THE LOWER COURT’S DECISION 
At the close of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment.  In denying that 
motion in the decision now before this Court, the lower court concluded that the accuracy of 
every fact about Verity contained in each of the three challenged stories was not dispositive 
                                                            
1 According to Verity, the latter implication arises only from the KGW broadcast because it, 
unlike the others, did not report that the Oregon student with whom he concededly had a sexual 




because Idaho recognizes a cause of action for what it described as “defamation by implication.”  
R. 1529 n.4.  To survive summary judgment in such a case, the court held, a plaintiff must show 
only that (1) the “statements – though literally true – could create false inferences” and that (2) 
those inferences were reasonable, intended, and (if the plaintiff is a public official or public 
figure) made “with actual malice,” that is, that they were “knowingly or recklessly . . . false.”  
R. 1523, 1529, 1532.2   
 Applying this legal standard to the three allegedly false implications that Verity placed at 
issue, the court concluded (1) that they could all be “infer[red]” from the challenged stories and 
(2) that “[t]here is evidence from which a jury could find” that defendants “implied, and intended 
to imply” each of them.  R. 1533.  The only “evidence” the court cited in support of this second 
conclusion was the language of the publications themselves and the fact that one or another of 
them had omitted other facts that, the court asserted, would have negated the alleged 
implications.  R. 1533-35.3   
                                                            
2 The court below also determined that Verity, a teacher and coach at a public high school, was 
not a public official, see R. 1530-32, and, as a result, was obliged to prove – with respect to this 
last element of his claim – only that “Defendants were negligent regarding the falsity of the 
implications they conveyed,” R. 1532.  For the reasons set forth in Defendants’ brief, amici 
respectfully submit that the lower court erred in this regard as well and that Verity is most 
certainly a public official for purposes of the law of defamation.  In this submission, amici focus 
on that aspect of the lower court’s decision that is of most concern to media organizations and 
journalists across the country – i.e., the unprecedented burden it purports to place on journalism 
about matters of public concern.   
3 Specifically, the lower court determined (1) that the first alleged implication – that Verity was a 
danger to female students – would have been negated if defendants had reported that, although 
one psychologist concededly determined he should not be alone with girls over age 12, another 
had opined that was not a risk to students, (2) that the second alleged implication – that Verity 





Amici, a coalition of Idaho and national media, submit this brief because, if the decision 
below is affirmed by this Court, the dissemination of truthful information about matters of public 
concern will be inhibited in a manner that cannot be squared with either the law of defamation or 
the First Amendment.  As amici explain in the pages that follow, the lower court’s decision 
demonstrates why Idaho (following the lead of other states) should not recognize a cause of 
action for “defamation by implication” based on the dissemination of concededly accurate facts 
about a matter of public concern.  Moreover, even if such a cause of action is deemed necessary, 
to survive constitutional scrutiny, it must be cabined in a manner that requires the plaintiff to 
demonstrate, as essential elements of the claim, (1) that the challenged publication, on its face, 
reasonably can be said both (a) to communicate the alleged defamatory implication and (b) to 
have endorsed its accuracy, and (2) that there is evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to find 
that the defendant was both aware of, and subjectively intended to communicate, the alleged 
implication.  In this case, in contrast, the court below:  
 Confused its threshold obligation to assess whether the challenged stories could 
reasonably be said to communicate the alleged defamatory meanings with the 
very different question of what a reader or viewer might “infer” from the accurate 
facts reported; 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
been disclosed by him to officials at one of the Idaho school districts at which he worked, but not 
the other, the stories had also mentioned that it had been provided to Idaho licensing authorities, 
and (3) that the third alleged implication – that he had committed a crime – would have been 
negated if the KGW broadcast had expressly stated that the student with whom he had 







 Failed to assess whether the challenged stories, on their face, can reasonably be 
said to have endorsed the alleged implications; and 
 
 Improperly conflated two distinct inquiries by holding that the requisite evidence 
of the defendants’ subjective awareness of and intention to communicate the 
alleged implication can be divined from the face of the publication, standing 
alone, including by identifying facts that it did not contain. 
 
Thus, even if this Court determines that Idaho should recognize a cause of action for 
implied defamation based on the publication of accurate facts about a matter of public concern, it 
should nevertheless hold that Verity has failed to state such a claim in this case because: 
 None of the challenged stories can reasonably be held to communicate the 
defamatory meanings that Verity was a danger to female students, that he 
deceived Idaho officials, or that he committed a crime; 
 
 Even if one or another of them did, none of them can reasonably be held, on their 
face, to endorse any of those implications; and 
 
 There is no evidence that any of the defendants was aware of and subjectively 
intended to communicate those implications in any event. 
 
I. Because Defamation-By-Implication Claims Based on the Reporting of Accurate 
Facts About Matters of Public Concern Necessarily Implicate First Amendment 
Freedoms, Several States Have Declined to Recognize Such a Cause of Action 
 In a typical defamation case, an allegedly false and defamatory fact is explicitly stated, 
e.g., “Joe murdered Anne.”  In a defamation-by-implication case, however, the plaintiff attempts 
to assert a cause of action despite the fact that “the reported facts are materially true and the 
alleged defamation is not explicitly stated.”  White v. Fraternal Order of Police (White II), 909 
F.2d 512, 518-19 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  As a result, defamation-by-implication cases are necessarily 




action is narrowly cabined, liability will not only be imposed based on alleged implications that 
are “manufactured” from truthful reporting about public matters, but valuable speech will 
inevitably be inhibited because of the fear that its dissemination will lead to just such liability.  
Id.   
 For this reason, the courts have recognized that the very existence of such a cause of 
action places both would-be speakers and judges in a very difficult position.  As one influential 
decision described the dilemma posed by such claims: “If a newspaper accurately reported that 
an individual was arrested and charged with a crime, a reader could reasonably infer, i.e., guess, 
surmise, or derive as a probability, that the individual actually committed the crime,” even if the 
reporter did not intend to communicate anything more than the accurate facts reported.  See 
White v Fraternal Order of Police (White I), 707 F. Supp. 579, 589, n.12 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d, 
909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  In such circumstances, if the reporter and newspaper can 
nevertheless be held liable, not for what they actually published, but for what some readers 
inferred from it, the ability of the press to gather and report about matters of public concern 
necessarily suffers.  Put differently, 
[R]equiring a publisher to guarantee the truth of all the inferences a reader might 
reasonably draw from a publication would undermine the uninhibited, open 
discussion of matters of public concern.  A publisher reporting on matters of 
general or public interest cannot be charged with the intolerable burden of 
guessing what inferences a jury might draw from an article and ruling out all 
possible false and defamatory innuendoes that could be drawn from the article. 
 




 Because of the risks inherent in the imposition of defamation liability based on the 
dissemination of truthful statements about public matters, and the difficulty in fashioning 
meaningful limitations on the scope of such a cause of action, several jurisdictions have decided 
that, on balance, it is best not to recognize a tort of defamation-by-implication based on the 
publication of accurate facts at all, at least where the plaintiff is a public official or public figure.  
See, e.g., Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446, 452 (Minn. 1990) (“an allegedly false 
implication arising out of true statements is generally not actionable in defamation by a public 
official”); Schaefer v. Lynch, 406 So. 2d 185, 188 (La. 1981) (“Even though a false implication 
may be drawn by the public, there is no redress for its servant.”); Mihalik v. Duprey, 417 N.E.2d 
1238, 1240-41 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981) (a public official plaintiff should not be able to pursue a 
defamation claim “where statements . . . were true,” even if “they have an insinuating overtone”).  
And at least some courts have determined that there should be no such cause of action, even if 
the plaintiff is not a public figure, where the publication at issue addresses a subject of public 
concern.  See Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 737 So. 2d 706, 717 (La. 1999) (“truthful facts which carry a 
defamatory implication can only be actionable if the statements regard a private individual and 
private affairs”); Collins v. WAFB, LLC, 2017 WL 1383948, at *8 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2017) 
(accurate reports “involv[ing] a private individual and a matter of public concern . . . cannot give 
rise to a claim for defamation, even if Plaintiff successfully showed that they carry a defamatory 
implication”).  As one leading treatise has explained: 
The defendant’s right to state the truth . . . might be undermined or destroyed if 
the defendant were held liable for the defamatory implications of complete and 




expressed doubts and cautions about imposing liability for the false and 
defamatory implications of accurate statements of fact.  Some have gone so far as 
to say that, [at least] with public figure plaintiffs, no action lies for libel by 
implication. 
 
3 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 566 (2d ed. 2011).4    
This Court has not directly addressed whether Idaho should recognize the cause of action.  
The lower court’s assertion that it did so in Wiemer v. Rankin, 790 P.2d 347 (Idaho 1990), see 
R. 1529, n.4, is simply not correct.  In Wiemer, this Court was not presented, as it is here, with a 
defamation-by-implication claim, at least as that cause of action has traditionally been defined – 
i.e., those cases in which the challenged implication allegedly arises from truthful speech about 
matters of public concern.  Rather, the plaintiff in Wiemer asserted that certain facts published by 
the defendant were false and that their publication gave rise to a false implication.  Id. at 352-53.  
This Court agreed that the plaintiff had carried his burden of proving the falsity of those explicit 
statements and, on that basis, permitted the claim to proceed.  Id.; see also Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 
F.2d 1304, 1310 (10th Cir. 1983) (requiring plaintiff to identify “false statements” before being 
allowed to proceed with defamation-by-implication claim).  The question of whether to 
recognize a cause of action for defamation-by-implication where, as here, it is conceded that all 
the stated facts are true, is therefore one of first impression in this Court.  For all of the reasons 
                                                            
4 See also Peter B Kutner, What Is Truth? True Suspects and False Defamation, 19 Fordham 
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1, 59 (2008) (“[s]everal courts . . . have held that there can be no 
liability” where the action is “premised on false implications found in a publication whose 
individual statements of fact were accurate”); Biro v. Conde Nast, 883 F. Supp. 2d 441, 464 & 
n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“some jurisdictions refuse to recognize a claim for a defamatory 
implication where the statements giving rise to the implication are all true”).  See generally, 
Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussel, The Plaintiff’s Burden in Defamation: Awareness and 




articulated by those courts that have declined to recognize such a tort, amici respectfully submit 
that this Court would be well served to reach the same conclusion.5 
                                                            
5 Indeed, for many of the same reasons, this Court should also consider whether it is appropriate 
to continue to recognize a cause of action for “false light” invasion of privacy of the kind Verity 
has asserted in this case.  While the Court has previously noted that “the precise elements of this 
cause of action are unclear,” Hoskins v. Howard, 971 P.2d 1135, 1140 (1998) (citation omitted), 
a growing number of states have rejected it entirely because – as this case demonstrates – it is 
essentially duplicative of a claim for defamation, albeit without at least some of the safeguards 
for free expression that surround that more established tort.  See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. 
Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1100, 1114 (Fla. 2008) (“because the benefit of recognizing the tort . . . 
is outweighed by the danger of unreasonably impeding constitutionally protected speech, we 
decline to recognize a cause of action for false light invasion of privacy”); Denver Publ’g Co. v. 
Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 894 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (declining to recognize tort because it is “highly 
duplicative of defamation both in interests protected and conduct averted” and “the subjective 
component of the false light tort raises the spectre of a chilling effect on First Amendment 
freedoms”); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235–36 (Minn. 1998) (refusing to 
recognize tort because “[w]e are concerned that claims under false light are similar to claims of 
defamation, and to the extent that false light is more expansive than defamation, tension between 
this tort and the First Amendment is increased”).  See generally, D. L. Zimmerman, False Light 
Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 364, 369-71 (1989) 
(demonstrating that the false light tort is both “conceptually empty” and unconstitutionally 
vague).  If the Court is nevertheless inclined to continue to recognize the false light tort at all, it 
should take this opportunity to correct the lower court’s erroneous recitation of its required 
elements – specifically, its failure to follow the Supreme Court’s express holding in Time, Inc. v. 
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), that a plaintiff asserting a false light claim arising from speech about a 
matter of public concern must prove actual malice, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a public 
or private figure.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (2018); Veilleux v. Nat'l Broad. 
Co., 206 F.3d 92, 134 (1st Cir. 2000); Zeran v. Diamond Broad., Inc., 203 F.3d 714, 718 (10th 
Cir. 2000); Dobkin v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 172 F.3d 43 (4th Cir. 1999); Puckett v. Am. Broad. 
Cos., 917 F.2d 1305 (6th Cir. 1990); Schifano v. Greene Cty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So. 2d 
178, 180 (Ala. 1993); Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 784 (Ariz. 1989).   




II. If this Court Does Decide to Recognize a Cause of Action for Defamation-by-
Implication, the Scope of the Tort Should be Narrowly and Precisely Defined to 
Safeguard Truthful Speech About Public Matters      
Those jurisdictions that have recognized the defamation-by-implication tort have 
emphasized that that such claims must be examined rigorously and that its required elements 
must be defined narrowly and precisely.  See, e.g., White II, 909 F.2d at 518-19 (“In entertaining 
claims of defamation by implication, courts must be vigilant not to allow an implied defamatory 
meaning to be manufactured from words not reasonably capable of sustaining such meaning”); 
Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1092-93 (4th Cir. 1993) (requiring an “especially 
rigorous showing” in libel-by-implication claims).  Specifically, in order to prevail on a 
defamation-by-implication claim based on the dissemination of truthful speech about public 
matters, courts have required plaintiffs to clear two distinct hurdles, one that requires judicial 
examination of the face of the challenged publication, and another that contemplates judicial 
assessment of the record evidence with respect to the defendant’s state of mind.  In this case, the 
lower court misconstrued and misapplied both of these requirements. 
A. The Threshold Determination   
To state a viable claim for defamation-by-implication based on the publication of 
accurate facts about a matter of public concern, a plaintiff must show, as a threshold matter, both 
that the implied defamatory meaning he attributes to the challenged publication is objectionably 




defendant.  See, e.g., White II, 909 F.2d at 520.6  In the leading case describing this requirement, 
which has since been followed by courts in virtually every jurisdiction that has considered the 
issue, the District of Columbia Circuit explained that every plaintiff must show at the outset that 
the challenged publication “be reasonably capable of a defamatory interpretation.”  Id. at 519.  
Of necessity, this inquiry contemplates a judicial determination of what meaning the challenged 
publication can reasonably be said to communicate, not simply what inferences a reader or 
viewer might draw from it.  As the district court in White explained through the hypothetical set 
out at page 8, supra, the relevant question centers on the meaning reasonably conveyed, and 
what a reasonable reader might infer from the facts reported is not dispositive of that very 
different inquiry.  Thus, while a reader might reasonably infer from a news report that the 
plaintiff had been arrested and charged with a crime that he was in fact the perpetrator of that 
crime, that inference does not constitute a defamatory meaning that the mere report of his arrest 
could reasonably be said to bear.  See White I, 707 F. Supp. at 589.             
Moreover, as the court emphasized in White, where the alleged defamatory meaning is 
implied from the defendant’s rendition of accurate facts about public matters, the conclusion that 
such a meaning may be reasonably conveyed is not enough.  In such circumstances, the court 
must also determine whether “the particular manner or language in which the true facts are 
conveyed, supplies additional, affirmative evidence suggesting that the defendant intends or 
                                                            
6 This inquiry is the same regardless of whether the plaintiff is a public or a private figure.  See, 
e.g., Rubin v. U.S. News & World Report, 271 F.3d 1305, 1309, n.11 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1152 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1995); Abadian v. Lee, 117 F. Supp. 




endorses the defamatory inference.”  White II, 909 F.2d at 520; accord Chapin, 993 F.2d at 
1092-93 (to satisfy this threshold inquiry, the language of the publication must “affirmatively 
suggest that the author intends or endorses the inference”).  In other words, as the D.C. Circuit 
further explained in White II:  
the court must first examine what defamatory inferences might reasonably be 
drawn from a materially true communication, and then evaluate whether the 
author or broadcaster has done something beyond the mere reporting of true facts 
to suggest that the author or broadcaster intends or endorses the inference. 
 
909 F.2d at 520.  Since White, courts across the country have consistently held that this threshold 
requirement governs defamation-by-implication claims arising from speech about matters of 
public concern.7   
 In White itself, the plaintiff was a police officer who had failed a drug test, and then, 
contrary to protocol, was given a second test.  Id. at 515.  Both the first and second urine samples 
                                                            
7 See, e.g., Chapin, 993 F.2d at 1093 (adopting White test and dismissing libel-by-implication 
claim); Kavanagh v. Zwilling, 578 F. App’x 24, 24–25 (2d Cir. 2014) (“To survive a motion to 
dismiss a claim for defamation by implication . . . the plaintiff must make a rigorous showing 
that the language of the communication as a whole can be reasonably read both to impart a 
defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that 
inference.” (citation omitted)); Deripaska v. Associated Press, 282 F. Supp. 3d 133, 148 (D.D.C. 
2017) (applying White test and dismissing claim); Wyoming Corp. Servs. v. CNBC, LLC, 32 F. 
Supp. 3d 1177, 1189 (D. Wyo. 2014) (“The language must not only be reasonably read to impart 
the false innuendo, but it must also affirmatively suggest that the author intends or endorses the 
inference.” (citation omitted)); Biro, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 470 (granting motion to dismiss 
defamation-by-implication claim because “nothing in the language [of the publication] suggests 
that Defendants intended or endorsed” the proffered implications); accord Heyward v. Credit 
Union Times, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1189 (D.N.M. 2012); Duncan v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 2011 
WL 1807017, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. May 9, 2011); Abadian, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 488; Webb v. 
Virginian-Pilot Media Cos., 752 S.E.2d 808, 810 (Va. 2014); Leddy v. Narragansett Television, 
L.P., 843 A.2d 481, 489 (R.I. 2004); Royal Palace Homes, Inc. v. Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc., 495 




were hand-delivered (again, contrary to protocol) to an out-of-state lab, among other 
“irregularities.”  That lab found both samples to be drug-free, and the plaintiff was thereafter 
promoted.  Two years later, the Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”) learned of these irregularities 
and sent letters to the mayor and the U.S. attorney outlining them while pointedly suggesting that 
there had been “a systematic effort to subvert the integrity of the drug testing procedures.”  Id.  
The police chief then opened an inquiry (called the “Cox Investigation”), which ultimately 
concluded that, although protocols were not properly followed, “there had been no tampering 
with the specimens.”  Id. at 515-16.  Several news organizations, including The Washington 
Post, published stories about the FOP’s allegations and the Cox Investigation.  Plaintiff sued 
both the FOP and the Post, among other defendants, for defamation and false light invasion of 
privacy.   
 The plaintiff conceded that all of the factual information in the Post’s stories and the FOP 
letter were accurate.  Id. at 525.  Nevertheless, he asserted that they falsely implied that he had, 
in fact, used illegal drugs, because they omitted certain facts that would have made his 
“innocence” clear (including that the first sample was confirmed by another lab to be untainted 
and that the test he initially took had a very low accuracy rate).  On the Post’s motion for 
summary judgment, the court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the omissions on which he 
relied created a defamatory implication.  Alleged omissions, the court explained, are not relevant 
to whether a defamatory implication exists on the face of the challenged publication, but rather 
only to the separate question of whether that alleged defamatory meaning, if it is reasonably 




determination with respect to meaning, the court concluded that the Post articles were “incapable 
of bearing a defamatory meaning based on the text of the articles themselves” as a matter of law.  
Id. at 526.  While a reader might infer (from the true facts reported) that the plaintiff used drugs, 
there was “no evidence in the text of the articles to suggest that it would be reasonable for a 
reader to conclude that the Post intended the defamatory inference,” such as “suggestive 
juxtapositions, turns of phrase, or incendiary headlines.”  Id. In contrast, the court held that the 
FOP was not entitled to summary judgment because its letter went “beyond merely reporting 
materially true facts.”  Id. at 521.  By asserting that “the high level of cannabinoids registered 
by” the first test “‘should easily have been confirmed,” and “raising the specter of criminal 
violations . . ., the FOP provided a clear signal . . . that the defamatory inference was intended or 
endorsed.”  Id. 
  In this case, the court below both misstated and misapplied this objective, threshold 
inquiry (is the proffered defamatory meaning reasonable and, if so, can the publication, on its 
face, reasonably be construed to endorse it?) in three important respects.  See R. 1532-33.  First, 
it plainly confused the question of what inferences a reader or viewer might draw from the 
accurate facts set out in the challenged stories with the first step of the actual threshold inquiry 
contemplated by White and its progeny – i.e., whether the implied defamatory meanings 
proffered by the plaintiff were reasonable ones.  See R. 1523 (plaintiff must prove only that 
“Defendants’ statements—though literally true—could create false inferences”) (emphasis 
added).  Simply put, unless the text of the challenged story, “considered as a whole, in context, 




alleged by the plaintiff, those stories cannot be “actionable” in defamation as a matter of law.  
White I, 707 F. Supp. at 589 n.12; see also Webb, 752 S.E.2d at 812 (just because readers may 
draw a defamatory inference does not mean that the inference is actionable).  In this case, amici 
respectfully submit no reasonable reader or viewer of the challenged stories would understand 
them to communicate the defamatory meanings that Verity attributes to them.  Rather, their only 
reasonable meaning is confined to the accurate facts they report – i.e., that Verity had a sexual 
relationship with a student, that he lost his teaching license in Oregon as a result, and that he 
subsequently secured employment in Idaho where one of his employers was concededly unaware 
of what had transpired in Oregon.       
 Second, the court below did not even purport to evaluate whether the challenged stories 
did anything “beyond the mere reporting of true facts to suggest” to a reasonable reader or 
viewer that the defendants “intend[ed] or endors[ed]” the proffered implications.  White II, 909 
F.2d at 520.  If it had, it could reach no reasonable conclusion other than that, like the Post 
articles at issue in White, they do not in any sense endorse any of the defamatory implications 
that Verity attributes to them.  In each of the challenged stories, the concededly accurate facts are 
set out in a straightforward manner and, unlike the FOP letter at issue in White, they contain no 
“suggestive juxtapositions, turns of phrase, or incendiary headlines” that could reasonably be 
construed as indicia of endorsement.  Id. at 526.  For this reason as well, Verity cannot state a 
claim for defamation-by-implication as a matter of law.   
 Finally, the court below erred when it purported to rely on alleged “omissions” from the 




meanings Verity attributes to them.  As the court explained in White, omissions are simply not 
relevant to assessing what meaning a challenged story can reasonably be held to bear.  Id. at 520-
21, 525.   At most, any such omissions become relevant only after the threshold hurdles 
contemplated by White and its progeny have been cleared, and then only for the purpose of 
assessing whether the defamatory meaning at issue is false in some material respect.  Id. at 520-
21.    In this case, the Court does not need to reach that question because the threshold 
requirement has not been satisfied.  See, e.g., Revil v. Coleman, 54 N.E.3d 608 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2016) (press release stating that teacher was placed on leave pending investigation of alleged 
sexual relationship with student did not communicate implied defamatory meaning that plaintiff 
was guilty, despite plaintiff’s allegation that the press release failed “to include pertinent facts” 
which “rendered it false”).8   
                                                            
8 Even if the Court were to consider the alleged omissions at this stage, it should conclude, as did 
the Court in White, that they are immaterial because the undisputedly accurate facts reported in 
the stories demonstrate that the “gist” of the alleged implications is substantially true.  Verity had 
an inappropriate sexual relationship with a high school student, a psychologist thereafter 
determined he should not be around girls over age 12, his Oregon teaching credentials were 
revoked as a result, and he told some Idaho officials, but not others, about what had taken place 
in Oregon.  As a matter of law, the “gist” or “sting” of these stories would not have been 
materially altered if they had also noted that a different psychologist believed Verity could have 
contact with middle and high schoolers, that there were additional Idaho officials that were also 
aware of his experience in Oregon, or that (with respect to the KGW broadcast) the high school 
student with whom he had a sexual relationship was 18.  See, e.g., Biro, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 465 
(noting that courts are skeptical of claims “based on the omission of facts that may have cast the 
plaintiff in a different, more positive light, but would not otherwise render the expressed 





B. The Fact-Based Determination 
 Beyond the threshold determination described in White and its progeny, a plaintiff 
alleging a cause of action for defamation-by-implication arising from speech about a matter of 
public concern must also establish that the defendant was in fact aware of the proffered 
defamatory implication and intended to communicate it.  See, e.g., Nichols v. Moore, 477 F.3d 
396, 402 (6th Cir. 2007) (granting summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to provide 
sufficient evidence “indicating that [the defendant] intended to falsely implicate” the plaintiff).  
Where the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, that showing must be supported by clear 
and convincing evidence.  See, e.g., Kendall v. Daily News Publ’g Co., 716 F.3d 82, 90-91 (3d 
Cir. 2013); Saenz v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1318-19 (7th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff must 
show by clear and convincing evidence that defendants “intended to imply” the defamatory 
meaning urged by the plaintiff); Worrell-Payne v. Gannett Co., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1176-77 
(D. Idaho 2000) (plaintiff must “present clear and convincing evidence from which a jury could 
find that the [defendant] actually intended to convey the false impressions”), aff’d, 49 F. App’x 
105, 106 (9th Cir. 2002).9   
                                                            
9 A public figure plaintiff’s burden of proving such a subjective “intention” necessarily arises in 
part from the overarching requirement that such a plaintiff show that the defendant published 
what amounted to a “calculated falsehood,”– i.e., publication either with knowledge that the 
alleged implication was false or with at least a “high degree of awareness” of its “probable 
falsity,” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.  See 
also Kendall, 716 F.3d at 93.   As courts across the country have uniformly recognized, that 
constitutional requirement would be meaningless if liability could “be imposed not only for what 
was not said but also for what was not intended to be said.”  Newton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 930 
F.2d 662, 681 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1318 (if a public official “must 




 In Kendall, for example, the defendant newspaper reported that the plaintiff, a judge, had 
released a criminal defendant, Castillo, on his own recognizance and that, shortly thereafter, 
Castillo murdered a 12-year-old girl.  716 F.3d at 84.  In describing the preliminary hearing, the 
article at issue stated:  “Kendall found probable cause to charge Castillo [with assault] but 
released him pending trial – despite Castillo’s history of violence, including charges of rape, 
assault and weapons violations.”  Id.  The plaintiff alleged that this sentence “implied that he was 
aware of Castillo’s violent history when, in fact, he was not” because those charges “were absent 
from the criminal record presented to [him]” at the hearing.  Id.  The Third Circuit nevertheless 
affirmed the lower courts’ entry of judgment for the defendant newspaper, holding that, to 
sustain a cause of action based on an implied defamatory meaning, there must be “evidence 
showing, directly or circumstantially, that the defendants themselves understood the potential 
defamatory meaning of their statement.”  Id. at 93 (emphasis added).  Indeed, because the 
plaintiff was a public official, the court recognized that such a finding must be supported by clear 
and convincing evidence, which necessarily required considerably more than an analysis of the 
four corners of the challenged publication itself.  Id. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
follows that where the plaintiff is claiming defamation by innuendo, he also must show with 
clear and convincing evidence that the defendants intended or knew of the implications that the 
plaintiff is attempting to draw”); Dodds v. Am. Broad. Co., 145 F.3d 1053, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 
1998) (plaintiff “must show that a jury could reasonably find by clear and convincing evidence 
that [the defendant] intended to convey the defamatory impression” (citation and internal marks 
omitted)); Woods, 791 F.2d at 487 (there can be no liability absent clear and convincing evidence 
that “the publisher of the statement either intended the statement to contain such a defamatory 
implication or even knew that readers could reasonably interpret the statement to contain the 
defamatory implication”); Jacobson v. CBS Broad., Inc., 19 N.E.3d 1165, 1178 (Ill. App. Ct. 





 Similarly, in Nichols, the plaintiff, the brother of one of the Oklahoma City bombers, 
challenged portions of the documentary film Bowling for Columbine on the ground that it falsely 
implied that he was involved in the bombing.  He pointed specifically to several accurate 
statements contained in the film that he alleged communicated such a false implication—that 
both “Nichols brothers made practice bombs before Oklahoma City;” that both were “arrested in 
connection to the bombing;” that “[o]fficials charged [plaintiff] . . . with conspiring to make and 
possess small bombs;” and, that while Terry Nichols was convicted, “the feds didn’t have the 
goods on [his brother] James, so the charges were dropped.”  477 F.3d at 398.10  The Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for the defendant despite its 
recognition “that a viewer of the movie could erroneously conclude that James Nichols made 
practice bombs in preparation for Oklahoma City, and was arrested and charged in the Oklahoma 
City bombing.”  Id. at 402.  It did so because it concluded that the “plaintiff’s evidence cannot 
meet the high hurdle presented by a defamation by implication claim,” which requires proof not 
simply that reasonable viewers could draw from the film the false implication he alleged, but 
also that the defendant “intended to falsely implicate James Nichols in the Oklahoma City 
bombing.”  Id.        
                                                            
10 On the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the court confirmed that all of these 
statements were substantially true:  The plaintiff had practiced making bombs “before Oklahoma 
City,” although not in connection with the bombing for which his brother was convicted, and he 
was arrested and charged with an explosives offense, although not with respect to “any criminal 





In this case, in contrast, the only “evidence” on which the court below based its 
determination that the defendants intended to communicate the alleged implications was its 
analysis of the content of the stories themselves.  See R. 1533, n.6 (“Evidence of a defendant’s 
intent to create a defamatory implication does not have to come in the form of extrinsic 
conduct,” but can be gleaned from “[t]he particular manner or language of the communication” 
itself).  This is plain error – indeed, it conflates the threshold objective determination articulated 
in White and its progeny with the distinct, fact-based determination described in cases like 
Kendall and Nichols.  For purposes of the threshold determination, the court properly looks only 
to the four corners of the publication or broadcast at issue to determine if (1) an implied 
defamatory meaning is reasonably conveyed, and, if it is, (2) whether the publication itself 
evinces an intention to endorse such an implication.  See, e.g., Chapin, 993 F.2d at 1092-93 
(relevant question is whether language of the publication at issue “affirmatively suggest[s] that 
the author intends or endorses the inference”).  If the cause of action clears that hurdle, the 
plaintiff must still satisfy the fact-based requirement by pointing to evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the defendant in fact intended to convey the defamatory 
implication.  See, e.g., Jacobson, 19 N.E.3d at 1180 (“The mere fact that a statement is capable 
of one defamatory inference” does not mean that the publisher “either intended the statement to 
contain such a defamatory implication or even knew that the readers could reasonably interpret 
the statement to contain the defamatory implication”) (citing Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1318; Woods, 
791 F.2d at 487); Newton, 930 F.2d at 681 (fact that “broadcast may be capable of supporting the 
impression [plaintiff] claims” does not therefore mean that defendant  “intended to convey the 
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defamatory implication”); cf. Wiemer, 790 P.2d at 357-59 (scrutinizing summary judgment 
record to determine whether there was sufficient evidence of actual malice).  Moreover, if the 
plaintiff is a public official or public figure, he must make the requisite showing by “clear and 
convincing evidence.”  See, e.g., Kendall, 716 F.3d at 90-91.     
In his opposition to defendants’ summary judgment motion, Verity provided no evidence 
that could support a jury finding that the defendants intended to convey the allegedly false 
implications at issue.  He cited to no document produced in discovery, no deposition testimony 
from any of the journalists responsible for the challenged stories, and no admissions by any of 
them secured through third-party testimony that even remotely evinces the requisite intention.    
Rather, the only “evidence” on which he and the lower court purported to rely is that defendants 
“omitted,” in one or another of the stories, facts the inclusion of which he asserts would have 
negated the false implications on which he bases his claims.  Such omissions, however, are 
insufficient to sustain the plaintiff’s burden as a matter of law, especially in the absence of 
independent evidence that the journalists responsible for the challenged stories intended by those 
omissions to create the false implications alleged.  There is simply no such evidence in the 
record of this case.  Moreover, as the courts have repeatedly recognized, judges are appropriately 
reluctant to substitute a defamation plaintiff’s judgment on such matters for the editorial choices 
made by professional journalists.  See, e.g., White II, 909 F.2d at 525 (press “should not be 
required to report the results of investigative journalism with a precision establishing an 
exhaustive, literal picture of what transpired”); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1305 
(8th Cir. 1986) (“Courts must be slow to intrude into the area of editorial judgment . . .with 
respect to inclusions in or omissions from news stories. Accounts of past events are always 
selective, and under the First Amendment the decision of what to select must almost always be 
left to writers and editors. It is not the business of government."). Accordingly, for this reason 
as well, this Court should properly reverse the decision below and enter judgment for defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated by the defendants, this Court should 
reverse the decision of the court below and hold that there is no cause of action in Idaho for 
defamation-by-implication, or, if there is such a tort, that the plaintiff has failed to state such as 
claim as a matter of law. 
DA TED this 25th day of April, 2018. 
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APPENDIX 
THE MEDIA AMICI 
Adams Publishing Group understands the need for local news in vibrant communities. 
APG’s 63 community newspapers, their 18 advertising shoppers, 20 specialty publications and 
81 associated websites provide an important communication tool for citizens and businesses in 
dozens of local communities across 15 states. 
Advance Publications, Inc., directly and through its subsidiaries, publishes more than 20 
print and digital magazines with nationwide circulation, local news in print and online in 10 
states, and leading business journals in over 40 cities throughout the United States. Through its 
subsidiaries, Advance also owns numerous digital video channels and internet sites. 
The American Society of News Editors (“ASNE”) is an organization with some 500 
members that include directing editors of daily newspapers throughout the Americas. ASNE 
changed its name in April 2009 to American Society of News Editors and approved broadening 
its membership to editors of online news providers and academic leaders. Founded in 1922 as 
American Society of Newspaper Editors, ASNE is active in a number of areas of interest to top 
editors with priorities on improving freedom of information, diversity, readership and the 
credibility of newspapers. 
The Associated Press is a not-for-profit mutual news cooperative.  The members of AP 
are more than 1,500 newspapers and more than 5,000 television and radio stations throughout the 
United States.  AP has journalists stationed in 321 locations worldwide, including in Idaho. 
BuzzFeed, Inc. is a social news and entertainment company that provides shareable 
breaking news, original reporting, entertainment, and video across the social web to its global 
audience of more than 200 million. 
The Center for Investigative Reporting (“CIR”), founded in 1977, is the nation’s first 
nonprofit investigative news organization. CIR produces investigative journalism for its website 
Reveal (https://www.revealnews.org/), the Reveal national public radio show and podcast, and 
various documentary and video projects -- often in collaboration with other newsrooms across 
the country. 
CNN owns and operates numerous news platforms and services that provide live 
coverage and analysis of breaking news, as well as a full range of international, political, 
business, entertainment, sports, health, science and weather coverage, and topical in-depth 
interviews. 
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Dow Jones & Company, Inc. is a global provider of news and business information, 
delivering content to consumers and organizations around the world across multiple formats, 
including print, digital, mobile and live events.  Dow Jones has produced quality content for 
more than 130 years and today has one of the world’s largest newsgathering operations. It 
produces leading publications and products including the flagship Wall Street Journal; Factiva; 
Barron’s; MarketWatch; Financial News; Dow Jones Risk & Compliance; Dow Jones 
Newswires; and Dow Jones VentureSource. 
The E.W. Scripps Company owns and operates 33 local television stations across the 
country, including KIVI-TV in Boise and KSAW-TV in Idaho Falls.  Scripps also owns and 
operates radio stations in eight markets throughout the United State, including four FM stations 
in Boise.  Scripps is the longtime steward of the Scripps National Spelling Bee. 
First Look Media is a not-for-profit American news organization that owns and operates 
several journalistic outlets, including The Intercept. 
Forbes is a global media company reaching more than 117 million people throughout the 
United States and worldwide through Forbes and Forbes Asia magazines, Forbes.com and 40 
licensed local editions covering more than 70 countries. 
Gray Television, Inc. is a television broadcast company headquartered in Atlanta, 
Georgia, that owns and operates over 100 television stations across 57 television markets that 
collectively broadcast over 200 program streams including over 100 channels affiliated with the 
CBS Network, the NBC Network, the ABC Network and the FOX Network.  In Idaho, Gray 
owns KMVT and KSVT, which are, respectively, the CBS and FOX affiliates in Twin Falls 
market.  Gray’s portfolio covers approximately 10.4 percent of total United States television 
households. 
The Hearst Corporation is one of the nation’s largest media companies. It owns and 
publishes 15 daily newspapers, including the Seattle Post-Intelligencer and the San Francisco 
Chronicle; nearly 300 magazines, including Good Housekeeping and O, The Oprah Magazine; 
and 29 television stations around the country. 
The Idaho Press Club is a statewide association of working journalists, from all media – 
newspaper reporters, broadcast journalists, radio reporters, photographers, bloggers, magazine 
writers and others.  Its members also include journalism students and teachers and retired 
journalists.  Its mission is to promote excellence in journalism, freedom of expression and 
freedom of information. 
The Idaho Statesman (McClatchy), established in 1864, is Boise's and Idaho’s source 





Landmark Media Enterprises, LLC (formerly Landmark Communications) is a 
privately held media company headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia with interests in print and 
internet publishing, internet marketing/web services, and data centers. 
 
The Media Institute is a nonprofit foundation specializing in communications policy 
issues.  The Institute exists to foster three goals: freedom of speech, a competitive media and 
communications industry, and excellence in journalism.  The Media Institute is one of the 
country’s leading organizations focusing on the First Amendment and speech-related issues. 
 
Meredith Corporation has been committed to service journalism for 115 years. Today, 
Meredith uses multiple distribution platforms — including broadcast television, print, digital, 
mobile and video — to provide consumers with content they desire. 
 
The National Association of Broadcasters is a nonprofit incorporated trade association 
that serves and represents radio and television stations and broadcast networks. Our members 
broadcast news, public affairs, entertainment and other programming to the people of Idaho and 
the nation, and NAB seeks to preserve and enhance its members’ ability to create and 
disseminate freely programming and information of all types. 
 
The News Media Alliance (“NMA”) is a nonprofit organization based in Washington, 
D.C., representing the interests of online, mobile, and print news publishers in the United States 
and Canada.  More than 2,000 news media organizations are members of the NMA.  NMA 
members account for nearly 90 percent of the daily newspaper circulation in the United States, as 
well as a wide range of online, mobile, and non-daily print publications.  The NMA focuses on 
the major issues that affect today’s news publishing industry, including protecting the ability of a 
free and independent media to provide the public with news and information on matters of public 
concern. 
 
The New York Times Company is the publisher of The New York Times and The 
International New York Times, and operates the news websites nytimes.com, inyt.com, and 
related properties.  In 2017, The Times had 1,450 journalists, reporting from 160 countries and 
across the United States, including in Idaho. 
 
POLITICO is a global news and information company. Since its launch in 2007, 
POLITICO has grown to more than 350 reporters, editors and producers. POLITICO distributes 
30,000 copies of its Washington newspaper on each publishing day, publishes POLITICO 
Magazine, with a circulation of 33,000 six times a year, and maintains a U.S. website with an 
average of 26 million unique visitors per month. 
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The Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of the Press is an unincorporated nonprofit 
association.  The Reporters Committee was founded by leading journalists and media lawyers in 
1970 when the nation’s news media faced an unprecedented wave of government subpoenas 
forcing reporters to name confidential sources. Today, its attorneys provide pro bono legal 
representation, amicus curiae support, and other legal resources to protect First Amendment 
freedoms and the newsgathering rights of journalists. 
The Radio and Television Digital News Association is the world's largest professional 
association devoted to advocating on behalf of broadcast and digital journalists. RTDNA’s Voice 
of the First Amendment Task Force defends against threats to press freedom targeting all 
journalists. Founded as a grassroots organization in 1946, RTDNA works to protect the rights of 
journalists in the courts and legislatures throughout the country, promotes ethical standards in the 
industry, provides members with training and education and honors outstanding work in the 
profession through the Edward R. Murrow Awards. 
The Society for Professional Journalists (“SPJ”) is dedicated to improving and 
protecting journalism. It is the nation’s largest and most broad-based journalism organization, 
dedicated to encouraging the free practice of journalism and stimulating high standards of ethical 
behavior. Founded in 1909 as Sigma Delta Chi, SPJ promotes the free flow of information vital 
to a well-informed citizenry, works to inspire and educate the next generation of journalists and 
protects First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press. 
tronc, Inc. is one of the country’s leading media companies. The company’s daily 
newspapers include the Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, New York Daily News, San Diego 
Union-Tribune, The Baltimore Sun, Sun Sentinel (South Florida), Orlando Sentinel, Hartford 
Courant, The Morning Call and Daily Press. Popular news and information websites, including 
www.chicagotribune.com and www.latimes.com, complement tronc’s publishing properties and 
extend the company’s nationwide audience. 
WP Company LLC d/b/a The Washington Post is one of the leading news 
organizations in the United States.  It publishes The Washington Post, a daily print newspaper 
based in the nation’s capital, as well as the website www.washingtonpost.com, which is read in 
all 50 states and around the world.  Washingtonpost.com reached an audience of more than 70 
million unique visitors per month in 2017. 
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